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Abstract
Bayesian and frequentist criteria are fundamentally different, but often posterior
and sampling distributions are asymptotically equivalent (e.g., Gaussian). For the cor-
responding limit experiment, we characterize the frequentist size of a certain Bayesian
hypothesis test of (possibly nonlinear) inequalities. If the null hypothesis is that the
(possibly infinite-dimensional) parameter lies in a certain half-space, then the Bayesian
test’s size is α; if the null hypothesis is a subset of a half-space, then size is above α
(sometimes strictly); and in other cases, size may be above, below, or equal to α. Two
examples illustrate our results: testing stochastic dominance and testing curvature of
a translog cost function.
JEL classification: C11, C12
Keywords: Bernstein–von Mises theorem, limit experiment, nonstandard inference,
stochastic dominance, translog
1 Introduction
Although Bayesian and frequentist properties are fundamentally different, often we can (ap-
proximately) achieve both. In other cases, Bayesian and frequentist summaries of the data
differ greatly. We provide results on the role of null hypothesis “shape” in determining such
differences. We hope to increase understanding and awareness of situations prone to large
differences.
Economic theory prominently features inequality restrictions, often nonlinear.1 For exam-
ple, inequality of cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) characterizes first-order stochas-
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Missouri, 118 Professional Bldg, 909 University Ave, Columbia, MO 65211-6040, United States. Many thanks
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1Nonlinear inequalities also come from other sources. For example, as in Kaplan (2015), H0 : θ1θ2 ≥ 0
can test stability of the sign of a parameter over time (or geography), or whether a treatment attenuates the
effect of another regressor.
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tic dominance (SD1), an important concept for welfare analysis. SD1 conclusions from fre-
quentist tests (that have correct asymptotic size) and Bayesian tests may differ greatly, and
the direction of the difference partly depends on whether the null hypothesis is dominance or
non-dominance. Inequalities also characterize second-order stochastic dominance, which is
also used for portfolio comparison in finance. An example of nonlinear inequalities is curva-
ture constraints on production, cost, indirect utility, and other functions. Such constraints
usually result from optimization, like utility or profit maximization. SD1 and curvature are
detailed in Section 4; additional economic examples are reviewed in Section 3.1.
Further motivation for studying Bayesian–frequentist differences is that deriving frequen-
tist tests for general nonlinear inequalities is notoriously difficult; e.g., see Wolak (1991). In
contrast, it is (relatively) simple to compute the posterior probability that the parameter
satisfies certain nonlinear inequalites, by computing the proportion of draws from the pa-
rameter’s posterior in which the constraints are satisfied. Perhaps especially in the absence
of a feasible frequentist method, it is helpful to understand if the Bayesian test’s size differs
greatly from the nominal α.
Statistically, we consider cases where the sampling distribution of an estimator is asymp-
totically Gaussian, while the asymptotic posterior is also Gaussian, with the same covariance
(i.e., a Bernstein–von Mises theorem holds). More generally, any symmetric distribution
suffices, and only a certain functional must have the equivalent sampling and posterior
distributions, making it easier to treat infinite-dimensional parameters. We examine the
corresponding limit experiment.
In this limit experiment, to quantify Bayesian–frequentist differences, we characterize the
frequentist size of a particular Bayesian test. This test rejects the null hypothesis H0 when
the posterior probability of H0 is below α. In addition to being intuitive and practically
salient, there are decision-theoretic reasons to examine this test, as detailed in Section 2.1.
Although size gives no insight into admissibility, it captures a practical difference between
reporting Bayesian and frequentist inferences.
Specifically, we describe how the Bayesian test’s size depends on the shape of H0. By
“the shape of H0,” we mean the shape of the parameter subspace where H0 is satisfied. If H0
is a half-space, then the Bayesian test has size α. If H0 is strictly smaller than a half-space
(in a certain sense), then the Bayesian test’s size is strictly above α. If H0 is not contained
within any half-space, then the Bayesian test’s size may be above, equal to, or below α. An
immediate corollary is that the Bayesian test’s size is α when testing a single linear inequality
constraint, whereas it is size-distorted when testing multiple linear inequalities.
Our results beg the question: if inferences on H0 can disagree while credible and con-
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fidence sets coincide, why not simply report the credible or confidence set?2 If interest is
primarily in the parameters themselves, then reporting a credible or confidence set may in-
deed be better. However, sometimes interest is in testing implications of economic theory or
in specification testing; other times, inequalities provide economically relevant summaries of
a high-dimensional parameter.
Literature Many papers compare Bayesian and frequentist inference. Here, we highlight
examples of different types of conclusions (not all directly comparable to inequality testing):
sometimes frequentist inference is more conservative, sometimes Bayesian, sometimes neither.
Some of the literature documents cases where frequentist inference is “too conservative”
from a Bayesian perspective. For testing linear inequality constraints of the form H0 : θ ≥ 0
with θ ∈ Rd, Kline (2011, §4) provides examples showing frequentist testing to be more
conservative (e.g., his Figure 1), especially as the dimension d grows; his examples are
consistent with our general theoretical results. As another example, under set identification,
asymptotically, frequentist confidence sets for the true parameter (e.g., Imbens and Manski,
2004; Stoye, 2009) are strictly larger than the estimated identified set, whereas Bayesian
credible sets are strictly smaller, as shown by Moon and Schorfheide (2012, Cor. 1).3 For
testing the null of a unit root in autoregression, Sims and Uhlig (1991) say frequentist tests
“accept the null more easily” (p. 1592), and they determine (sample-dependent) priors that
equate p-values and posterior probabilities.
Other papers document cases where frequentist inference is “too aggressive” from a
Bayesian perspective. Perhaps most famously, in Lindley’s (1957) paradox, the frequen-
tist test rejects while the Bayesian test does not. Berger and Sellke (1987) make a similar
argument. In both cases, as noted by Casella and Berger (1987b), the results follow primarily
from having a large prior probability on a point (or “small interval”) null hypothesis, specif-
ically P(H0) = 1/2. Arguing that P(H0) = 1/2 is “objective,” Berger and Sellke (1987,
p. 113) consider even P(H0) = 0.15 to be “blatant bias toward H1.” Casella and Berger
(1987b) disagree, saying P(H0) = 1/2 is “much larger than is reasonable for most problems”
(p. 344).
In yet other cases, Bayesian and frequentist inferences are similar or even identical.
Casella and Berger (1987a) compare Bayesian and frequentist one-sided testing of a location
parameter, given a single draw of X from an otherwise fully known density. They compare
2Berger (2003) also notes this possible disagreement/agreement, but he writes, “The disagreement occurs
primarily when testing a ‘precise’ hypothesis” (p. 2), whereas we find disagreements even with inequality
hypotheses. Also, Casella and Berger (1987b, p. 344) opine, “Interval estimation is, in our opinion, superior
to point null hypothesis testing,” although they do not mention composite null hypotheses like in this paper.
3There seems to be a typo in the statement of Corollary 1(ii), switching the frequentist and Bayesian
sets from their correct places seen in the Supplemental Material proof.
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the p-value to the infimum of the posterior P(H0 | x) over various classes of priors. In many
cases, the infimum is attained by the improper prior of Lebesgue measure on (−∞,∞) and
equals the p-value (p. 109). Berger, Brown, and Wolpert (1994) establish an equivalence of
Bayesian and conditional frequentist testing of a simple null hypothesis against a simple
alternative. Goutis, Casella, and Wells (1996) consider jointly testing multiple one-sided
hypotheses in a single-draw Gaussian shift experiment. If the components of X are mutually
independent and the improper prior sets P(H0) = 1/2, then the posterior is proportional to
one of the frequentist p-values they consider, but it is (weakly) smaller. This complements
our setting where we do not impose independence, P(H0) = 1/2, finite dimensionality, or
restricted null hypothesis shape.
Paper structure and notation Section 2 presents the setup and assumptions. Section 3
contains our main results and discussion. Section 4 illustrates our results with stochastic
dominance and cost function curvature examples. Appendix A contains proofs. Appen-
dices B–D contain details on testing equality of parameters’ signs, translog cost functions,
and infinite-dimensional Bernstein–von Mises theorems, respectively. Acronyms used include
those for cumulative distribution function (CDF), data generating process (DGP), negative
semidefinite (NSD), posterior expected loss (PEL), probability density function (PDF), rejec-
tion probability (RP), and first-order stochastic dominance (SD1). Notationally, ⊆ is subset
and ⊂ is proper subset; scalars, (column) vectors, and matrices are respectively formatted
as X , X, and X; 0(·) denotes the zero function, i.e., 0(t) = 0 for all t.
2 Setup and assumptions
In Section 2.1, a specific Bayesian hypothesis test is described along with the decision-
theoretic context. In Section 2.2, the assumptions used for the results in Section 3 are
presented and discussed. Section 2.3 contains addition details and references about “the”
Bernstein–von Mises theorem.
2.1 The Bayesian test and decision-theoretic context
The Bayesian test rejects the null hypothesis when its posterior probability is below α.
Method 1 (Bayesian test). Reject H0 if P(H0 | X) ≤ α; otherwise, accept H0.
In addition to seeming intuitive, Method 1 is a generalized Bayes decision rule that
minimizes posterior expected loss (PEL) for the loss function taking value 1 − α for type I
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error, α for type II error, and zero otherwise. To see this, let P(· | X) denote the posterior
probability given observed dataX. The PEL for the decision to rejectH0 is (1−α) P(H0 | X),
i.e., the type I error loss times the posterior probability that rejecting H0 is a type I error.
Similarly, the PEL of accepting H0 is α[1− P(H0 | X)], i.e., the type II error loss times the
probability that accepting H0 is a type II error. PEL is thus minimized by rejecting H0 if
P(H0 | X) ≤ α and accepting H0 otherwise.
Our results compare the frequentist size of the Bayesian test in Method 1 to α (instead
of some other value) for practical and decision-theoretic reasons. Practically, the Bayesian
test can be seen as treating the posterior as a (frequentist) p-value; we want to know if this
is valid, similar to Casella and Berger (1987a). Decision-theoretically, the same loss function
used to compute PEL could be used to compute a minimax risk decision rule that is closely
related to a frequentist hypothesis test. Specifically, if an unbiased frequentist test with
size α exists, then it is the minimax risk decision rule. Even without unbiasedness, this is
approximately true given conventional values of α (below).
The minimax risk decision rule can be characterized and compared to an unbiased fre-
quentist test. Let θ ∈ Θ, H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 ⊂ Θ, H1 : θ 6∈ Θ0. “Minimax risk” minimizes
max
{
(1− α) sup
θ∈Θ0
Pθ(reject), α sup
θ 6∈Θ0
Pθ(accept)
}
= max
{
(1− α) sup
θ∈Θ0
Pθ(reject), α[1− inf
θ 6∈Θ0
Pθ(reject)]
}
,
(1)
where Pθ(·) is probability under θ. Consider a test with size γ0 = supθ∈Θ0 Pθ(reject). If
the test is unbiased, then supθ∈Θ0 Pθ(reject) ≤ infθ 6∈Θ0 Pθ(reject). If the power function is
continuous in θ, then (writing ∂Θ0 for the boundary of Θ0, which is also the boundary of
its complement)
sup
θ∈Θ0
Pθ(reject) ≥ sup
θ∈∂Θ0
Pθ(reject) ≥ inf
θ∈∂Θ0
Pθ(reject) ≥ inf
θ 6∈Θ0
Pθ(reject).
Thus,
γ0 =
unbiasedness︷ ︸︸ ︷
sup
θ∈Θ0
Pθ(reject) ≤ inf
θ 6∈Θ0
Pθ(reject) ≤ sup
θ∈Θ0
Pθ(reject)︸ ︷︷ ︸
continuity
= γ0,
and (1) becomes max{(1− α)γ0, α(1− γ0)}. The minimum value α(1− α) is attained with
γ0 = α; if γ0 < α, then α(1 − γ0) > α(1 − α), and if γ0 > α, then (1 − α)γ0 > α(1 − α).
Without unbiasedness, infθ 6∈Θ0 Pθ(reject) ≤ γ0, so α[1 − infθ 6∈Θ0 Pθ(reject)] ≥ α(1 − γ0),
weakly increasing the minimax risk. Thus, assuming continuity of the power function, the
minimax risk decision rule is an unbiased frequentist hypothesis test with size α. See also
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Lehmann and Romano (2005, Problem 1.10) on unbiased tests as minimax risk decision
rules.
Without unbiasedness, the minimax-risk-optimal size of a test is above α, but the mag-
nitude of the difference is very small for conventional α. As a function of γ0, let γ1(γ0) ≡
infθ 6∈Θ0 Pθ(reject), so (1) is max{(1− α)γ0, α(1− γ1(γ0))}. Continuity restricts γ1(γ0) ≤ γ0,
but we now drop the unbiasedness restriction γ1(γ0) ≥ γ0. In the extreme, γ1(γ0) = 0 for
all γ0, and the maximum risk is α for any test with γ0 ≤ α/(1− α), while maximum risk is
larger than α if γ0 > α/(1− α). If instead γ1(γ0) is strictly increasing in γ0 but γ1(α) < α,
then minimax risk is achieved at some γ0 ∈ (α, α/(1− α)). For example, rounding to two
significant digits, if α = 0.05, then γ0 ∈ (0.050, 0.053), or if α = 0.1, then γ0 ∈ (0.10, 0.11).
Such small divergence of γ0 from α is almost imperceptible in practice.
Ideally, a single decision rule minimizes both the maximum risk in (1) and the PEL.
However, if the Bayesian test’s size is significantly above or below α, this is not possible.
In such cases, it may help to use both Bayesian and frequentist inference and to carefully
consider the differences in optimality criteria.
2.2 Assumptions
Assumption A1 states conditions on the sampling and posterior distributions of a functional
φ(·) in the (limit) experiment we consider. As usual, the sampling distribution treats the
(functional of the) data φ(X) as random and conditions on the parameter θ, whereas the
posterior treats the (functional of the) parameter φ(θ) as random and conditions on the data
X.
Assumption A1. Let F (·) be a continuous CDF with support R and symmetry F (−x) =
1−F (x). Let the (lone) observation X and the parameter θ both belong to a Banach space
of possibly infinite dimension. Let φ(·) denote a continuous linear functional, with sampling
distribution φ(X)− φ(θ) | θ ∼ F and posterior φ(θ)− φ(X) | X ∼ F .
Assumption A1 can be interpreted as a limit experiment where θ is a local mean pa-
rameter. The limit distribution F is often N(0, σ2), satisfying the continuity, support, and
symmetry conditions. For example, consider a simple asymptotic setup leading to scalar X
and θ with φ(X) = X and φ(θ) = θ. If Yni
iid∼ N(µn, 1), i = 1, . . . , n, and
√
nµn → θ, then√
nY¯n = n
−1/2
∑n
i=1 Yni
d−→ N(θ, 1); more generally, if Yni iid∼ N(m+ µn, σ2) and
√
nµn → θ,
then
√
n(Y¯n − m)/σˆ d−→ N(θ, 1) for any consistent estimator σˆ2 p−→ σ2. This type of result
holds for a wide variety of models, estimators, and sampling assumptions; it is most com-
monly used for local power analysis but has been used for purposes like ours in papers like
Andrews and Soares (2010, eqn. (4.2)). Since θ is the local mean parameter, assuming θ ∈ R
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does not require that R is the original parameter space (e.g., the space for m + µn in the
example), but it does exclude boundary points. Results for posterior asymptotic normality
date back to Laplace (1820), as cited in Lehmann and Casella (1998, §6.10, p. 515).
Seeing A1 as a limit experiment, implicitly the prior has no asymptotic effect on the
posterior. This phenomenon is called the Bernstein–von Mises theorem; see Section 2.3.
This is an especially reasonable assumption when the Bayesian test in practice uses an
uninformative prior.
For our purpose of approximating the finite-sample frequentist size of a Bayesian test,
considering a fixed DGP and drifting centering parameter can be just as helpful as considering
a fixed centering parameter and drifting DGP. This allows the relevant Bernstein–von Mises
theorem to hold only for fixed (not drifting) DGPs. For example, in Rd,
Xn =
√
n(µˆ− µ0,n) =
d−→N(0,Σ)︷ ︸︸ ︷√
n(µˆ− µ)+
→θ︷ ︸︸ ︷√
n(µ− µ0,n) d−→
limit experiment︷ ︸︸ ︷
X ∼ N(θ,Σ),
(2)
where µ is the true parameter value, µˆ is a
√
n-normal estimator (as seen), Σ is the known
or consistently estimable asymptotic covariance matrix, and Xn is a statistic based on µˆ and
centered at the deterministic sequence µ0,n that satisfies
√
n(µ−µ0,n)→ θ, the local mean
parameter. This does not have a literal meaning like “we must change µ0 if our sample size
increases,” just as a drifting DGP does not mean literally that “the population distribution
changes as we collect more data”; rather, it is simply a way to capture the idea of µ0 being
“close to” the true µ in the asymptotics. For the posterior, letting θn =
√
n(µ− µ0,n) and
again Xn =
√
n(µˆ− µ0,n), assuming a Bernstein–von Mises theorem,
θn −Xn =
√
n(µ− µˆ) d−→ N(0,Σ). (3)
The common case of a Gaussian limit (plus a Bernstein–von Mises theorem) generally
satisfies A1. When the Banach space in A1 is Rd, continuous linear functionals are sim-
ply linear combinations φ(X) = c′X for some constant vector c ∈ Rd. With multivariate
Gaussian X and θ, linear combinations are (scalar) Gaussian random variables, satisfying
the assumption. More generally, including infinite-dimensional spaces, if X(·) is a Gaussian
process in some Banach space and φ(·) belongs to the dual of that space, then φ(X(·)) is a
scalar Gaussian random variable; e.g., see Definition 2.2.1(ii) in Bogachev (1998, p. 42) and
van der Vaart and Wellner (1996, pp. 376–377). In infinite dimensions, it is usually even
easier to show the functional’s asymptotic normality by direct arguments.
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2.3 Bernstein–von Mises theorems
Seeing Assumption A1 as a limit experiment, a Bernstein–von Mises theorem holds: the
asymptotic sampling and posterior distributions are both F . This is equivalent to using an
improper uninformative prior in the limit experiment. For example, with sampling distribu-
tion X | θ ∼ N(θ, 1) and prior θ ∼ N(m, τ 2), the posterior is
θ | X ∼ N
(
τ 2X +m
τ 2 + 1
,
τ 2
τ 2 + 1
)
,
and taking τ 2 →∞ yields the posterior θ | X ∼ N(X, 1), satisfying A1. The improper prior
is fine with inequality testing because only posterior probabilities are used (see Method 1),
unlike with point null hypothesis testing based on Bayes factors that involve a ratio of prior
probabilities (e.g., Bayarri, Berger, Forte, and Garc´ıa-Donato, 2012).
There are versions of the Bernstein–von Mises theorem for parametric, semiparametric,
and nonparametric models. The first two are discussed below. The third is not necessary
(though it can be sufficient) for Assumption A1 since the functional φ is finite-dimensional,
so discussion is relegated to Appendix D.
Parametric versions of the Bernstein–von Mises theorem are the oldest and can be found
in textbooks. They differ in regularity conditions and in how to quantify the distance
between two distributions, but they share the requirement that the prior density be both
continuous and positive at the true value. For example, see Theorem 10.1 in van der Vaart
(1998, §10.2) and Theorems 20.1–3 in DasGupta (2008, §20.2), where Theorem 20.3 allows
non-iid sampling.
General semiparametric versions of the Bernstein–von Mises theorem have been estab-
lished, too. For example, see Shen (2002), Bickel and Kleijn (2012), and Castillo and Rousseau
(2015), who allow non-iid sampling. There are also earlier papers for specific models like
GMM and quantile regression; see Hahn (1997, Thm. G and footnote 13), Kwan (1999, Thm.
2), Kim (2002, Prop. 1), Lancaster (2003, Ex. 2), Schennach (2005, p. 36), Sims (2010, Sec.
III.2), and Norets (2015, Thm. 1), among others.
3 Results and discussion
Theorem 1 contains this paper’s main results. Discussion and special cases follow.
Theorem 1. Let Assumption A1 hold. Consider testing H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 against H1 : θ 6∈ Θ0
with the Bayesian test in Method 1, where Θ0 is a subset of the Banach space in A1.
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(i) If there exists a φ(·) satisfying A1 and value c0 ∈ R such that Θ0 = {θ : φ(θ) ≤ c0}
(i.e., Θ0 is a half-space), then the Bayesian test’s size is α, and its type I error rate is
α when φ(θ) = c0.
(ii) If there exists a φ(·) satisfying A1 and value c0 ∈ R such that Θ0 ⊆ {θ : φ(θ) ≤ c0}
with c0 ∈ φ(Θ0) (where Θ0 denotes the closure), then the Bayesian test’s size is α or
greater.
(iii) Continuing from Theorem 1(ii), assume there exists a φ2(·) satisfying A1 with distri-
bution F2 over R
d and satisfying the properties below; φ(·) = φ2(·) if d = 1. Assume
the φ(·) from Theorem 1(ii) may be written as φ(·) = φ3(φ2(·)) for some φ3(·). Assume
there exists (in Rd) a set Φ2 ≡ {φ2(θ) : θ ∈ Θ0} ⊂ {φ2(θ) : φ(θ) ≤ c0}. If θ ∈ Rd,
then one may set φ2(θ) = θ, φ3(·) = φ(·), and Φ2 = Θ0. Further assume (a) the set
∆ ≡ {p : p ∈ Rd, φ3(p) ≤ c0,p 6∈ Φ2} has positive Lebesgue measure, (b) F2 has a
strictly positive PDF over Rd, and (c) P(φ2(θ) ∈ Φ2 | φ2(X)) is continuous in φ2(X).
Then, the Bayesian test’s rejection probability is strictly above α when φ(θ) = c0, and
its size is strictly above α.
(iv) If, contrary to Theorem 1(ii), there do not exist any φ(·) and c0 such that Θ0 ⊆ {θ :
φ(θ) ≤ c0} (i.e., Θ0 is not a subset of a half-space), then the Bayesian test’s size may
be greater than, equal to, or less than α, and it may depend on the sampling/posterior
distribution.
3.1 Discussion of results
Intuitively, Theorem 1(i) holds by the symmetry of F . It holds for higher-dimensional pa-
rameters by finding a single inequality on a scalar-valued functional that is both necessary
and sufficient for H0. Theorem 1(ii) and Theorem 1(iii) hold because when parts of the
half-space are carved away to make Θ0 smaller, the posterior probability of H0 (at any X)
becomes smaller, making the Bayesian test more likely to reject. For infinite-dimensional pa-
rameters, this logic is essentially applied to a test of a finite-dimensional necessary condition
for H0.
Theorem 1(ii) has a geometric interpretation: if Θ0 has a supporting hyperplane, then the
Bayesian test’s size is at least α. Theorem 1(iii) gives sufficient conditions for the Bayesian
test’s RP to be strictly above α for any θ that is a support point of Θ0.
Theorem 1(iii) is partly a result of the prior P(H0) being “small” when Θ0 is small. That
is, the prior over the parameter is always the same (regardless of Θ0), so the implicit prior
P(H0) shrinks when Θ0 shrinks. (Technically, the limit experiment’s prior is an improper
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constant prior, so P(H0) is not well-defined, but the qualitative idea remains.) Unless Θ0
is a half-space, this differs from Berger and Sellke (1987) and others who only consider
“objective” priors with P(H0) = 0.5. Whether placing a prior on the null (like P(H0) = 0.5)
or on the parameter is more appropriate depends on the empirical setting; e.g., do we have
prior reason to suspect SD1? Often it is easier computationally not to set a specific P(H0);
e.g., one may use the same posterior to compute probabilities of many different hypotheses.
However, for hypotheses like SD1, this can lead to a very small “P(H0)” and consequently
very large rejection probabilities (and size distortion).
Although the implicit P(H0) partially explains Theorem 1(iii), the shape of Θ0 still plays
an important role. For example, in R2, let θ = (θ1, θ2) and H0 : θ1θ2 ≥ 0, so Θ0 comprises
the first and third quadrants (and thus is not contained in any half-space). This Θ0 is the
same “size” as the half-space {θ : θ1 ≥ 0}. However, with bivariate normal sampling and
posterior distributions, Theorem 1(i) implies the Bayesian test of the half-space has size α,
whereas the size of the Bayesian test of H0 : θ1θ2 ≥ 0 may be either strictly above or equal
to α, depending on the correlation. For example, let X = (X1, X2) have a bivariate normal
sampling distribution with Corr(X1, X2) = −1. Then the test is equivalent to a scalar test
where H0 is a finite, closed interval, in which case the Bayesian test’s size strictly exceeds α
by Theorem 1(iii). The same holds for other strong negative correlations, but size decreases
to α as the correlation increases; see Appendix B as well as Kaplan (2015, §3.2) for details.
Theorem 1(ii) and Theorem 1(iii) can apply to Θ0 = {θ : g(θ) ≤ g0} when g(·) is
directionally differentiable, as in Fang and Santos (2015) and others. For example, all the
examples in Section 4 of Fang and Santos (2015) concern θ belonging to a convex set. They
provide a frequentist resampling scheme that is consistent and corresponding hypothesis
tests that control asymptotic size. Thus, in cases like this where Theorem 1(iii) applies, not
only is the Bayesian test’s (asymptotic) size strictly above α, but it is also strictly above the
size of an available frequentist test.
The condition of Θ0 being a subset of a half-space holds for many economic examples.
The examples of stochastic dominance and curvature constraints (on functions describing
cost, production, etc.) are explored in Section 4. As noted above, the examples in Section
4 of Fang and Santos (2015) also satisfy this condition, “encompass[ing] tests of moment
inequalities, shape restrictions, and the validity of random utility models” (§4, p. 25), the
latter referring to Stoye and Kitamura (2013). The general moment inequality null hypoth-
esis H0 : E[W] ≤ 0 with W ∈ Rd as in equation (58) of Fang and Santos (2015) includes
special cases like testing discrete (or ordinal) first-order stochastic dominance and testing
the performance of financial trading rules against a benchmark as in equations (4) and (5)
of Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999, 2001), among many other applications. Wolak
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(1989, §6) considers shape/monotonicity restrictions corresponding to H0 : (−β1, β2, β3) ≥ 0
in his model of residential electricity demand. Example 4.2 of Fang and Santos (2015) con-
siders shape restrictions on the infinite-dimensional regression quantile process, e.g., the
restriction that the coefficient on the regressor of interest is monotonic in the quantile index.
In finance, Patton and Timmermann (2010) test asset return monotonicity (of various types)
using null hypotheses that are all strict subsets of half-spaces in Rd, such as (with altered
notation) H0 : θ ≤ 0 in their (5), H0 : θij ≤ θi−1,j , θij ≤ θi,j−1 for all i, j in their (13), and
H0 : θjN ≤ θjN−1 ≤ · · · ≤ θj0 in their (19).
Whether Θ0 is treated as H0 or H1 affects the size of the Bayesian test: if Θ0 satisfies
Theorem 1(iii), then its complement does not. Combining Theorem 1(iii) and Theorem 1(iv),
the Bayesian test of H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 may have size strictly above α while the Bayesian test of
H0 : θ 6∈ Θ0 has size strictly below or equal to α, as with SD1 (Section 4.1).
Many nonlinear inequalities could be recast as linear inequalities, but at the expense
of additional approximation error. For example, for g : Rd 7→ R and underlying (non-local)
parameter µ ∈ Rd, the nonlinear H0 : g(µ) ≤ 0 could be written as H0 : β ≤ 0 with β ≡ g(µ).
By the delta method (e.g., Hansen, 2018, Thm. 6.12.3), if g(·) is continuously differentiable in
a neighborhood of µ andG ≡ ∂
∂u
g(u)
∣∣
u=µ
, then
√
n(µˆ−µ) d−→ N(0,V) implies √n(βˆ−β) d−→
N(0,G′VG). To be concrete, imagine d = 2 and g(µ) = µ21+µ
2
2−1, so {u : g(u) ≤ 0} is the
unit disk in R2; the delta method gives
√
n(g(µˆ)− g(µ)) d−→ N(0, 4µ′Vµ). Further imagine
µˆ ∼ N(µ,V/n) in a finite sample of n observations, with the corresponding posterior. Then
the Bayesian test’s size is strictly above α, as in Theorem 1(iii); as the sampling variance
V/n grows, size grows to 1. In apparent contradiction, H0 : β ≤ 0 suggests the Bayesian
test has correct asymptotic size, by Theorem 1(i). The “contradiction” is simply that the
asymptotic result is less accurate, due to the delta method’s linear approximation of g(·). We
avoid this layer of delta method approximation by treating nonlinear inequalities directly,
providing better finite-sample insights. These insights remain practically helpful for any Θ0
as long as the sampling and posterior distributions are close to their limits.
3.2 Special cases of results
In the special case when X, θ ∈ R, similar results to Theorem 1(i) are found in the literature,
like in Casella and Berger (1987a). Less general versions of Theorem 1(ii) and Theorem 1(iii)
have also been given when X, θ ∈ R.
Theorem 1(iii) covers a special case explored in examples by Kline (2011, §4). Let θ ∈ Rd,
with H0 : θ ≥ 0 (elementwise) against H1 : θ 6≥ 0 (i.e., at least one element θj < 0). Kline
(2011, p. 3136) explains the possible divergence of Bayesian and frequentist conclusions as
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the dimension d grows, when the distribution is multivariate normal with identity matrix
covariance. He gives the example of observing X = 0, where for large d the Bayesian
P(H0 | X = 0) ≈ 0 while the frequentist p-value is near one. Inverting his example illustrates
Theorem 1(iv). If H0 and H1 are switched to get H0 : θ 6≥ 0 and H1 : θ ≥ 0, then the
divergence is in the opposite direction: P(H0 | X = 0) ≈ 1, and large P(H0 | X) can occur
even when the p-value is near zero. For example, the point X = (1.64, 1.64, . . . , 1.64) ∈ Rd
is the corner of the rejection region for the likelihood ratio test with size α = 0.05, but the
corresponding P(H0 | X) = 0.40 when d = 10, 0.72 when d = 25, and 0.99 when d = 90.
Theorem 1 also includes the special case of linear inequalities in Rd. Theorem 1(i) states
that for a single linear inequality H0 : c
′θ ≤ c0, the Bayesian test has size α. Theorem 1(iii)
states that for multiple linear inequalities, the Bayesian test’s size is strictly above α, and
its RP is strictly above α at every boundary point of Θ0.
4 Examples
We illustrate Theorem 1 through examples of first-order stochastic dominance and curvature
constraints in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
4.1 Example: first-order stochastic dominance
For testing first-order stochastic dominance (SD1), let Xi
iid∼ FX(·), Yi iid∼ FY (·) and inde-
pendent of the Xi sample, and F0(·) is non-random, where all distributions are continuous.
One-sample SD1 is FX(·) ≤ F0(·); two-sample SD1 is FX(·) ≤ FY (·); “non-SD1” means SD1
is not satisfied.
First, we show how Theorem 1 applies to SD1. Second, we provide analytic results from
the limit experiment. Third, we show simulated finite-sample results.
4.1.1 SD1: application of Theorem 1
As we show below, Theorem 1 implies that the Bayesian test’s asymptotic size is strictly
above α when the null hypothesis is SD1 but that this may not hold when the null is non-
SD1. This subsection shows how SD1 and non-SD1 satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1(iii)
and Theorem 1(iv), respectively.
Although FX(·) is infinite-dimensional, only finite-dimensional marginal distributions
are required to apply Theorem 1. Consider the simpler Theorem 1(ii) first. Let Xn(·) ≡√
n
(
FˆX(·) − F0,n(·)
)
and θn(·) ≡
√
n
(
FX(·) − F0,n(·)
)
, where (from the frequentist view)
θn(·)→ θ(·), the local mean parameter. SD1 is equivalent to θ(·) ≤ 0(·). Although limits of
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the full infinite-dimensional sequences are tractable (see Section 4.1.2), only a scalar-valued
functional is needed for Theorem 1(ii). Let φ(θ(·)) = θ(r) for some (any) r ∈ R, so θ(·) ≤
0(·) =⇒ φ(θ(·)) ≤ 0, satisfying the condition of Theorem 1(ii) that Θ0 ⊆ {θ(·) : φ(θ(·)) ≤
0}. Let Dn ≡ φ(Xn(·)) =
√
n(FˆX(r) − F0,n(r)) and γn ≡ φ(θn(·)) =
√
n(FX(r) − F0,n(r)).
Writing Zi = 1{Xi ≤ r}, then FX(r) = E(Zi) and FˆX(r) = n−1
∑n
i=1 Zi, i.e., we are con-
cerned only with the mean of a random variable. The asymptotic sampling distribution of
Dn − γn is N
(
0, FX(r)[1− FX(r)]
)
, satisfying the continuity, support, and symmetry condi-
tions in Assumption A1. The remainder of A1 is satisfied if a semiparametric Bernstein–von
Mises theorem for the mean holds. This and even stronger results hold with a Dirichlet
process prior, as in Lo (1983).
For Theorem 1(iii), we only need strengthen the Bernstein–von Mises theorem from a
scalar to a bivariate vector (d = 2), which again holds with a Dirichlet process prior
(Lo, 1983), for example. Here, let φ2(θ(·)) = (θ(r), θ(t)) for r, t ∈ R, and φ3(p) = p1 so
φ3(φ2(θ(·))) = θ(r) = φ(θ(·)). Also, θ(·) ≤ 0(·) =⇒ (θ(r), θ(t)) ≤ 0, satisfying the con-
dition in Theorem 1(iii) on Φ2 = {p : p1 ≤ 0, p2 ≤ 0}. Continuing to follow the notation
from Theorem 1(iii), ∆ = {p : p1 ≤ 0, p2 > 0}, which has positive (indeed infinite) Lebesgue
measure as required. The bivariate asymptotic distribution F2 is bivariate normal, which
again satisfies A1 as well as the continuity and strictly positive PDF requirement.
For testing non-SD1, Theorem 1(iv) applies. Non-SD1 is satisfied in the entire half-space
{θ(·) : θ(r) ≥ 0}, as well as most of the complement half-space (e.g., if θ(r) < 0 but θ(t) ≥ 0),
so it cannot be contained in any half-space.
For the two-sample setting, the infinite-dimensional limits in Section 4.1.2 are more than
sufficient to establish the scalar and bivariate conditions of Theorem 1(iii), and again non-
SD1 cannot be contained in any half-space.
4.1.2 SD1: results from limit experiment
We derive the infinite-dimensional limit experiment and then compute certain results. Con-
tinuing some notation from Section 4.1.1, consider the one-sample setup with Xi
iid∼ FX(·).
Again let θn(·) ≡
√
n
(
FX(·)− F0,n(·)
) → θ(·), the local parameter. SD1 of FX over F0 can
be written equivalently as
FX SD1 F0 ⇐⇒ FX(·) ≤ F0(·) ⇐⇒ θ(·) ≤ 0(·). (4)
Since (by Donsker’s theorem)
√
n
(
FˆX(·)−FX(·)
)
 B
(
FX(·)
)
for standard Brownian bridge
B(·), similar to (2),
Xn(·) ≡
√
n
(
FˆX(·)− F0,n(·)
)
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=
√
n
(
FˆX(·)− FX(·)
)
+
√
n
(
FX(·)− F0,n(·)
)
 B
(
FX(·)
)
+ θ(·), (5)
so the limit experiment has X(·) − θ(·) | θ(·) ∼ B(FX(·)). Note B(FX(·)) is a mean-zero
Gaussian process with covariance function Cov(t1, t2) = FX(t1)[1 − FX(t2)] for t1 ≤ t2.
Although FX(·) is unknown, FˆX(·) a.s.→ FX(·) uniformly by the Glivenko–Cantelli theorem, so
asymptotically the covariance function is known while the (local) mean function θ(·) remains
unknown. Analogously, for the posterior, similar to (3),
θn(·)−Xn(·) =
√
n
(
FX(·)− FˆX(·)
)
 B
(
FX(·)
)
, (6)
using the Bernstein–von Mises theorem in Lo (1983, 1987) for Dirichlet process prior Bayesian
inference or Theorem 4 of Castillo and Nickl (2014).
The two-sample setting is similar since we assume the samples are independent. For
notational simplicity, assume both samples have n observations. Let ∆(·) ≡ FX(·)− FY (·),
the true CDF difference function. Let ∆0,n(·) be the centering functions satisfying
√
n(∆(·)−
∆0,n(·))→ θ(·), the local parameter. SD1 of FX over FY is
FX SD1 FY ⇐⇒ FX(·) ≤ FY (·) ⇐⇒ θ(·) ≤ 0(·). (7)
For the sampling distribution,
Xn(·) ≡
√
n(FˆX(·)− FˆY (·)−∆0,n(·))
=
√
n(FˆX(·)− FX(·))−
√
n(FˆY (·)− FY (·)) +
√
n(∆(·)−∆0,n(·))
 B1(FX(·))− B2(FY (·)) + θ(·), (8)
where B1(·) and B2(·) are independent standard Brownian bridges. For the posterior, using
the independence of samples and Bernstein–von Mises theorem,
θn(·)−Xn(·) =
√
n(FX(·)− FˆX(·))−
√
n(FY (·)− FˆY (·))
 B1(FX(·))− B2(FY (·)). (9)
First, consider the Bayesian posterior probability of SD1 when X(·) = 0(·). The finite-
sample analog is when FˆX(·) ≈ F0(·) or FˆX(·) ≈ FˆY (·). The value 0(·) is at the very “corner”
of Θ0, and it is a very pointy corner, so a ball centered at 0(·) contains very little of Θ0. In
fact, “very little” means “zero probability,” as the next result states.
Proposition 2. Consider the limit experiment posterior for one-sample SD1 testing in (6)
and for two-sample SD1 testing in (9). Given X(·) = 0(·), the posterior probability of SD1
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is zero in both one-sample and two-sample settings.
Second, similar intuition and arguments lead to the SD1 Bayesian test’s size being one.
Proposition 3. Consider the limit experiment for one-sample SD1 testing in (5) and (6)
and for two-sample SD1 testing in (8) and (9). Consider the Bayesian test from Method 1
that rejects H0 : θ(·) ≤ 0(·) iff the posterior probability of H0 is below α. Then, the Bayesian
test’s size equals one, with type I error rate equal to one when θ(·) = 0(·).
Third, the following result for non-SD1 rejection probability is immediate.
Corollary 4. Consider same setup as in Proposition 3. When θ(·) = 0(·), the Bayesian
test’s probability of rejecting non-SD1 is zero.
4.1.3 SD1: finite-sample simulations
The following simulation results reflect the theoretical results from the limit experiment
(discussed in Section 4.1.1). Code for replication is provided.
Table 1 shows Bayesian posterior probabilities of SD1 and non-SD1 in datasets near the
“corner” of SD1, similar to the setup of Proposition 2. In the one-sample case, this means
FˆX(·) nearly equals the Unif(0, 1) CDF. In the two-sample case, this means FˆX(·) nearly
equals FˆY (·). Specifically, we set Xi = i/(n+1) for i = 1, . . . , n, and in the two-sample case,
Yi = i/n for i = 1, . . . , n − 1 (there are n − 1 observations in the second sample). When
n < ∞, the Bayesian bootstrap variant of Banks (1988) is used. When n = ∞, the results
are from Proposition 2.
Table 1: Bayesian posterior probabilities of H0 : X SD1 Unif(0, 1) and H0 : X SD1 Y .
Comparison distribution
H0 n Unif(0, 1) Y
SD1 10 0.103 0.097
SD1 40 0.028 0.025
SD1 100 0.009 0.010
SD1 ∞ 0.000 0.000
non-SD1 10 0.897 0.903
non-SD1 40 0.972 0.975
non-SD1 100 0.991 0.990
non-SD1 ∞ 1.000 1.000
Table 1 illustrates the Bayesian interpretation of a draw near X(·) = 0(·). This in-
terpretation differs greatly from a frequentist interpretation and illuminates the rejection
15
probabilities seen in Table 2. The same intuition before Proposition 2 applies here. Conse-
quently, when FˆX(·) ≈ F0(·), or when FˆX(·) ≈ FˆY (·), the Bayesian posterior places nearly
zero probability on SD1 and (equivalently) almost all probability on non-SD1. Table 1 shows
finite-sample posterior probabilities when n = 100 to be very close to the limit as n → ∞.
Opposite the Bayesian interpretation, a frequentist p-value for the null of SD1 would be near
one when the estimated FˆX(·) is near F0(·) or FˆY (·). These results are qualitatively similar
to those for the one-sample, finite-dimensional example in Kline (2011, §4).
Table 2: Bayesian test rejection probabilities, α = 0.1, 1000 replications.
Comparison distribution
H0 n Unif(0, 1) Y
SD1 10 0.740 0.655
SD1 40 0.935 0.917
SD1 100 0.981 0.977
SD1 ∞ 1.000 1.000
non-SD1 10 0.000 0.005
non-SD1 40 0.000 0.000
non-SD1 100 0.000 0.000
non-SD1 ∞ 0.000 0.000
Table 2 shows rejection probabilities of the Bayesian test when θ(·) = 0(·). This is the
“least favorable configuration” for the null of SD1 (but not for non-SD1). The DGP has
Xi
iid∼ Unif(0, 1) for i = 1, . . . , n. For one-sample testing, F0(·) is the true (standard uniform)
CDF of Xi. For two-sample testing, Yi
iid∼ Unif(0, 1) for i = 1, . . . , n, identical to Xi. The
hypotheses, methods, and notation are the same as for Table 1. The entries for n = ∞ use
Proposition 3 and Corollary 4.
Table 2 shows the same patterns as Table 1. When H0 is SD1, the Bayesian type I error
rate is well above α even with n = 10, with rejection probability increasing to 100% as n
grows; consequently, size is also above α. The opposite occurs when H0 is non-SD1, which
is not a subset of a half-space, with type I error rates of zero.4
4.2 Example: curvature constraints
One common nonlinear inequality hypothesis in economics is a “curvature” constraint like
concavity. Such constraints come from economic theory, often the second-order condition
4Although the type I error rate for non-SD1 is near zero with this DGP, the test’s size is actually α,
which is attained when there is a single “contact point” with FX(r) = FY (r) and the inequalities are strict
for all other t 6= r, thus reducing the test (asymptotically) to a single, scalar inequality.
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of an optimization problem like utility maximization or cost minimization. As noted by
O’Donnell and Coelli (2005), the Bayesian approach is appealing for imposing or testing
curvature constraints due to its (relative) simplicity. However, according to Theorem 1,
since curvature is usually satisfied in a parameter subspace much smaller than a half-space,
Bayesian inference similar to Method 1 may be much less favorable toward the curvature
hypothesis than frequentist inference would be; i.e., the size of the Bayesian test in Method 1
may be well above α. This is true in Table 3 below.
Our example concerns concavity of a cost function with the “translog” functional form
(Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau, 1973). This has been a popular way to parameterize cost,
indirect utility, and production functions. The translog is more flexible than many tradi-
tional functional forms, allowing violation of certain implications of economic theory (such
as curvature) without reducing such constraints to the value of a single parameter. Since Lau
(1978), there has been continued interest in methods to impose curvature constraints during
estimation, as well as methods to test such constraints. Although “flexible,” the translog
is still parametric, so violation of curvature constraints may come from misspecification (of
the functional form) rather than violation of economic theory.5
Specifically, we test concavity of cost in input prices as follows.6 With output y, input
prices w = (w1, w2, w3), and total cost C(y,w), the translog model is
ln(C(y,w)) = a0 + ay ln(y) + (1/2)ayy[ln(y)]
2 +
3∑
k=1
ayk ln(y) ln(wk)
+
3∑
k=1
bk ln(wk) + (1/2)
3∑
k=1
3∑
m=1
bkm ln(wk) ln(wm).
(10)
Standard economic assumptions imply that C(y,w) is concave in w (as in Kreps, 1990,
§7.3), which corresponds to the Hessian matrix (of C with respect to w) being negative
semidefinite (NSD), which in turn corresponds to all the Hessian’s principal minors of order
p (for all p = 1, 2, 3) having the same sign as (−1)p or zero.7
For simplicity, we consider local concavity at the point (1, 1, 1, 1):
H0 : H ≡ ∂
2C(y,w)
∂w∂w′
∣∣∣∣
(y,w)=(1,1,1,1)
is NSD. (11)
5With a nonparametric model, one may more plausibly test the theory itself, although there are always
other assumptions that may be violated; see Dette, Hoderlein, and Neumeyer (2016) for nonparametrically
testing negative semidefiniteness of the Slutsky substitution matrix.
6The “translog” example on page 346 of Dufour (1989) is even simpler but appears to ignore the fact
that second derivatives are not invariant to log transformations.
7In some cases, only leading principal minors are required; see Mandy (2017).
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This is necessary but not sufficient for global concavity; rejecting local concavity implies
rejection of global concavity. In Appendix C, we show that even this weaker constraint
corresponds to a set of parameter values much smaller than a half-space, so Theorem 1(iii)
applies.
Our simulation DGP is as follows. To impose homogeneity of degree one in input prices,
we use the normalized model (with error term ǫ added)
ln(C/w3) = a0 + ay ln(y) + (1/2)ayy[ln(y)]
2 +
2∑
k=1
ayk ln(y) ln(wk/w3)
+
2∑
k=1
bk ln(wk/w3) + (1/2)
2∑
k=1
2∑
m=1
bkm ln(wk/w3) ln(wm/w3) + ǫ
(12)
for both data generation and inference.8 The parameter values are b1 = b2 = 1/3, b11 =
b22 = 2/9− δ (more on δ below), and b12 = −1/9 to make some of the inequality constraints
in H0 close to binding, as well as a0 = 1, ay = 1, ayy = 0, ayk = 0. The other parameter
values follow from imposing symmetry (bkm = bmk) and homogeneity. When δ = 0, H is a
matrix of zeros, on the boundary of being NSD in that each principal minor equals zero (and
none are strictly negative). When δ > 0, all principal minors are strictly negative (other
than det(H) = 0, which is always true under homogeneity). We set δ = 0.001. In each
simulation replication, an iid sample is drawn, where ln(y) and all ln(wk) are N(0, σ = 0.1),
ǫ ∼ N(0, σǫ), and all variables are mutually independent. There are n = 100 observations
per sample, 500 simulation replications, and 200 posterior draws per replication. The local
monotonicity constraints b1, b2, b3 ≥ 0 were satisfied in 100.0% of replications overall.
Table 3 reports values from two methods. For the method denoted “Bayesian boot-
strap” in the table header, the posterior probability of H0 is computed by a nonparamet-
ric Bayesian method with improper Dirichlet process prior, i.e., the Bayesian bootstrap
of Rubin (1981) based on Ferguson (1973) and more recently advocated in economics by
Chamberlain and Imbens (2003). For the method denoted “Normal,” the parameter vector
is sampled from a normal distribution with mean equal to the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimate and covariance matrix equal to the corresponding (homoskedastic) asymptotic co-
variance matrix estimate; this is the posterior from a homoskedastic normal linear regression
model with improper prior (or asymptotically). To accommodate numerical imprecision,
we deem an inequality satisfied if it is within 10−7. The simulated type I error rate is the
proportion of simulated samples for which the posterior probability of H0 was below α.
8Alternatively, cost share equations may be used. Shephard’s lemma implies that the demand for input k
is xk = ∂C/∂wk. The cost share for input k is then sk = xkwk/C = (∂C/∂wk)(wk/C) = ∂ ln(C)/∂ ln(wk) ≡
rk = bk + ayk ln(y) +
∑3
j=1 bjk ln(wj).
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Table 3: Simulated type I error rate of Bayesian tests of local NSD.
Bayesian
α σǫ bootstrap Normal
0.05 0.00 0.000 0.000
0.05 0.10 0.112 0.084
0.05 0.20 0.354 0.318
0.05 0.30 0.554 0.532
0.05 0.40 0.676 0.694
0.05 0.50 0.764 0.772
0.10 0.00 0.000 0.000
0.10 0.10 0.186 0.160
0.10 0.20 0.530 0.526
0.10 0.30 0.740 0.764
0.10 0.40 0.844 0.872
0.10 0.50 0.890 0.910
Table 3 shows the type I error rate of the Bayesian tests of (11) given our DGP. The
values of α and σǫ are varied as shown in the table. The two Bayesian tests are very similar,
always within a few percentage points of each other. As a sanity check, when σǫ = 0, the RP
is zero since the constraints are satisfied by construction. As σǫ increases, the RP increases
well above α, even over 50%.9 Although the Bayesian test’s size distortion with the null of
local NSD is clearly bad from a frequentist perspective, it reflects the Bayesian method’s
need for great evidence to conclude in favor of local NSD, which may be reasonable since
the translog form does not come from economic theory and since only a small part of the
parameter space satisfies local NSD. Either way, it is helpful to understand the behavior of
Bayesian inference in this situation.
5 Conclusion
We have explored the frequentist properties of Bayesian inference on general nonlinear
inequality constraints, providing formal results on the role of the shape of the null hy-
pothesis parameter subspace. Future work could include investigation of approaches like
Mu¨ller and Norets (2016) applied to nonlinear inequality testing, or extensions to allow
(proper) priors with P(H0) = 1/2 or other values. Moreover, one could explore how to
achieve correct frequentist size by adjusting the prior P(H0) or by adjusting the relative
weight of type I and II errors in the loss function, or how to achieve a posterior probability
9The results with δ = 0.01 are similar; with δ = 0, RP jumps to over 80% even with σǫ = 0.001.
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of H0 equal to the p-value from a common frequentist method.
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. For Theorem 1(i): the Bayesian test rejects iff
α ≥ P(φ(θ) ≤ c0 | X) = P(φ(θ)− φ(X) ≤ c0 − φ(X) | X) ≡ F (c0 − φ(X)).
Given any θ such that φ(θ) ≤ c0 (so H0 holds), the RP is
P
(
F (c0 − φ(X)) ≤ α | θ
)
= P
( by symmetry︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− F (φ(X)− c0) ≤ α | θ
)
= P
(
F (φ(X)− c0) ≥ 1− α | θ
)
since φ(θ) ≤ c0 under H0︷ ︸︸ ︷
≤ P(F (φ(X)− φ(θ)) ≥ 1− α | θ)
= α
since F
(
φ(X)− φ(θ)) | θ ∼ Unif(0, 1). If φ(θ) = c0, then the ≤ becomes =.
For Theorem 1(ii): because Θ0 ⊆ {θ : φ(θ) ≤ c0}, then for any X,
P(θ ∈ Θ0 | X) ≤ P
(
φ(θ) ≤ c0 | X
)
.
Consequently, the rejection region for H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 is at least as big as the rejection region
for H0 : φ(θ) ≤ c0: for some r ∈ R,
R1 ⊆ R2, R1 ≡ {X : P(φ(θ) ≤ c0 | X) ≤ α} = {X : φ(X) ≥ r},
R2 ≡ {X : P(θ ∈ Θ0 | X) ≤ α}.
(13)
Given any θ ∈ Θ0, the probability that X falls in the new, larger rejection region (R2) is
at least as big as the probability that X falls in the old, smaller rejection region (R1) from
Theorem 1(i). In particular, when φ(θ) = c0, the RP was exactly α in Theorem 1(i). Since
the new rejection region is weakly larger, the new RP when φ(θ) = c0 must be at least α. If
c0 ∈ φ(Θ0), then the proof is complete. Otherwise, with R1 and R2 from (13), and θ∗ any
value such that φ(θ∗) = c0 (with the limit formed by a sequence of θ within Θ0),
sup
θ∈Θ0
P(X ∈ R2 | θ)
since c0 ∈ φ(Θ0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
≥ lim
θ→θ∗
P(X ∈ R2 | θ)
by (13)︷ ︸︸ ︷
≥ lim
θ→θ∗
P(X ∈ R1 | θ)
= lim
θ→θ∗
P
(
φ(X) ≥ r | θ) = lim
θ→θ∗
P(φ(X)− φ(θ) ≥ r − φ(θ) | θ) = lim
θ→θ∗
1− F (r − φ(θ))
by continuity of F, φ︷ ︸︸ ︷
= 1− F (r − c0)
by Theorem 1(i)︷︸︸︷
= α . (14)
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For Theorem 1(iii): given the stated assumption that the posterior distribution of φ2(θ)
has a strictly positive PDF for any φ2(X), and the assumption that ∆ has positive Lebesgue
measure, then
P(φ2(θ) ∈ ∆ | φ2(X)) > 0 for any φ2(X). (15)
Similar to (13), for some r ∈ R, let
Ra ⊆ Rb, Ra ≡ {φ2(X) : P(φ3(φ2(θ)) ≤ c0 | φ2(X)) ≤ α} = {φ2(X) : φ3(φ2(X)) ≥ r},
Rb ≡ {φ2(X) : P(φ2(θ) ∈ Φ2 | φ2(X)) ≤ α}. (16)
Let p∗ be any value such that φ3(p
∗) = r. Then,
P(θ ∈ Θ0 | φ2(X) = p∗)
since θ∈Θ0 =⇒ φ2(θ)∈Φ2︷ ︸︸ ︷
≤ P(φ2(θ) ∈ Φ2 | φ2(X) = p∗)
=
=α by Theorem 1(i)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(φ3(φ2(θ)) ≤ c0 | φ2(X) = p∗)−
>0 by (15)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(φ2(θ) ∈ ∆ | φ2(X) = p∗)
< α.
By the assumption that P(φ2(θ) ∈ Φ2 | φ2(X)) is continuous in φ2(X), there is some ǫ-ball
B around p∗ for which P(θ ∈ Θ0 | φ2(X) ∈ B) < α, too. The ball B has positive Lebesgue
measure, as does the part of it lying outside Ra (i.e., B ∩ R∁a) since p∗ is on the boundary
of Ra. Since the sampling distribution of φ2(X) given any θ has a strictly positive PDF (by
assumption),
P
(
φ2(X) ∈ (B ∩ R∁a) | θ
)
> 0 for any θ. (17)
Also, using the assumption in A1 that the distribution of φ2(θ) only depends on X through
φ2(X), as well as the assumption that θ ∈ Θ0 =⇒ φ2(θ) ∈ Φ2,
P(φ2(θ) ∈ Φ2 | φ2(X)) = P(φ2(θ) ∈ Φ2 | X) ≥ P(θ ∈ Θ0 | X),
so P(φ2(θ) ∈ Φ2 | φ2(X)) ≤ α =⇒ P(θ ∈ Θ0 | X) ≤ α. Consequently,
φ2(X) ∈ Rb =⇒ X ∈ R2. (18)
Letting θ∗ be a value such that φ3(φ2(θ
∗)) = φ(θ∗) = c0, the Bayesian test’s rejection
probability is bounded from below by
P(X ∈ R2 | θ∗)
by (18)︷ ︸︸ ︷
≥ P(φ2(X) ∈ Rb | θ∗)
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==α by Theorem 1(i)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(φ2(X) ∈ Ra | θ∗)+
>0 by (17)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P
(
φ2(X) ∈ (B ∩ R∁a) | θ∗
)
> α.
As in the proof of Theorem 1(ii), if θ∗ ∈ Θ0, then the test’s size is bounded below by
P(X ∈ R2 | θ∗) and the proof is complete. Otherwise, as before, the assumed continuity
and c0 ∈ φ(Θ0) imply
sup
θ∈Θ0
P(X ∈ R2 | θ) ≥ lim
θ→θ∗
P(X ∈ R2 | θ) = P(X ∈ R2 | θ∗).
For Theorem 1(iv), some examples suffice. First, consider H0 : φ(θ) 6= 0. Given any X,
P(φ(θ) 6= 0 | X) = 1 since F is continuous, so the Bayesian test never rejects and its size is
zero. Thus, size may be strictly below α. Second, consider H0 : φ(θ) ∈ Z (the integers). This
H0 has zero posterior probability given any X, so the Bayesian test always rejects and has
size equal to one. Thus, size may be strictly above α. Third, consider the bivariate example
with H0 : θ1 ≤ 0 or θ2 ≤ 0. Let the sampling/posterior distribution be bivariate normal with
unit variances and known correlation ρ. If ρ = 1, then X1 − θ1 = X2 − θ2 in every draw
of (X1, X2), i.e., it becomes a one-dimensional problem. Consequently, if θ1 − θ2 ≥ 0, then
X1 − X2 ≥ 0 in every draw, and we may simply test H0 : θ2 ≤ 0 using X2 ∼ N(θ2, 1), the
Bayesian test of which has size α. Similarly, if θ1 − θ2 ≤ 0, then X1 − X2 ≤ 0 in every
draw, and the Bayesian test of H0 : θ1 ≤ 0 has size α. Fourth, Appendix B provides an
example where the Bayesian test’s size may be strictly above α or equal to α depending
on the sampling/posterior distribution. Another (less practically interesting) example is if
H0 : θ2 6= −θ1 or θ1 = θ2 = 0. Using the bivariate normal distribution above, if ρ = −1 and
θ1 = θ2 = 0, then the problem reduces to a point null hypothesis for which this Bayesian test
has 100% size. Conversely, if ρ = 1, then the test’s size is zero since the posterior probability
of the complement of Θ0 is zero given any (X1, X2).
Proof of Proposition 2. In the one-sample case, using (6),
P(FX SD1 F0 | X(·) = 0(·)) = P(θ(·) ≤ 0(·) | X(·) = 0(·)) = P(B(FX(·)) ≤ 0(·))
= P(B(·) ≤ 0(·)) = P( sup
t∈[0,1]
B(t) ≤ 0) = 0. (19)
The final equality holds because the distribution of the supremum of a mean-zero Brownian
bridge is continuous and has non-negative support; e.g., see Theorem 2 in Smirnov (1939)
or equation (1.1) in Birnbaum and Tingey (1951).
For two-sample testing, the result in (19) extends readily if we assume FX = FY since
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then B1(FX(·)) − B2(FY (·)) = B1(F (·)) − B2(F (·)) d=
√
2B(F (·)) for another independent
Brownian bridge B(·). More generally,10 let
T (·) ≡ B1(FX(·))−B2(FY (·)),
the distribution of θ(·) conditional on X(·) = 0(·). Using (9),
P(FX SD1 FY | X(·) = 0(·)) = P(θ(·) ≤ 0(·) | X(·) = 0(·)) = P(T (·) ≤ 0(·))
= P(sup
r∈R
T (r) ≤ 0). (20)
Let L denote the smaller of the lower bounds of the distributions FX and FY , allowing
L = −∞ if both have unbounded support. Let W (·), W1(·), and W2(·) denote independent
standard Brownian motion processes. We may write
B1(t) = W1(t)− tW1(1), B2(t) = W2(t)− tW2(1),
V (·) ≡W1(FX(·))−W2(FY (·)) d=
√
2W ((FX(·) + FY (·))/2),
Z(·) ≡ V (·)− T (·) = FX(·)W1(1)− FY (·)W2(1).
Looking at T (r) = V (r)− Z(r) as r ↓ L, the Z(r) becomes negligibly small, while the V (r)
varies sufficiently to attain a strictly positive supremum almost surely. Specifically,
lim
r↓L
Z(r)√
FX(r) + FY (r)
= 0,
so continuing from (20) with the ≤ changed to >,
P(sup
r∈R
T (r) > 0) ≥ P
(
lim sup
r↓L
T (r)√
FX(r) + FY (r)
=∞
)
= P
(
lim sup
r↓L
V (r)− Z(r)√
FX(r) + FY (r)
=∞
)
= P
(
lim sup
r↓L
V (r)√
FX(r) + FY (r)
=∞
)
= P
(
lim sup
r↓L
√
2√
FX(r) + FY (r)
W
(
FX(·) + FY (·)
2
)
=∞
)
= 1
by the (local) law of iterated logarithm.11
10Thanks to Iosif Pinelis for help extending to FX 6= FY : https://mathoverflow.net/a/292716/120669
11E.g., Corollary 5.3 in https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~peres/bmbook.pdf
27
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that the type I error rate is one when θ(·) = 0, which
directly implies the size is one, too. For the two-sample case, θ(·) = 0(·) implies FX(·) =
FY (·), so the limit experiment simplifies since B1(FX(·))−B2(FY (·)) d=
√
2B(F (·)) for F (·) =
FX(·) = FY (·) and standard Brownian bridge B(·). Thus, both one-sample and two-sample
limiting distributions can be written as cB(·), where c = 1 for one-sample and c = √2 for
two-sample.
The Bayesian test rejects when the posterior is below α, so the probability of not rejecting
when θ(·) = 0 is
P(X(·) ∈ {x(·) : P(θ(·) ≤ 0(·) | X(·) = x(·)) > α} | θ(·) = 0(·))
= P(X(·) ∈ {x(·) : P(cB(F (·)) ≤ −x(·)) > α} | θ(·) = 0(·)).
This can be shown to be zero via the unconditional probability
P(cB(F (·)) + cB(F (·)) ≤ 0(·)) = P(
√
2cB(F (·)) ≤ 0(·)) = P(B(·) ≤ 0(·)) = 0, (21)
again using (19), where B1(·), B2(·), and B(·) are independent standard Brownian bridges.
For any set S,
P(θ(·) ≤ 0(·) | X(·) ∈ S) P(X(·) ∈ S)
= P(cB1(F (·)) +X(·) ≤ 0(·) | X(·) ∈ S) P(X(·) ∈ S | θ(·) = 0)
= P(cB1(F (·)) +X(·) ≤ 0(·) and X(·) ∈ S | θ(·) = 0)
≤ P(cB1(F (·)) +X(·) ≤ 0(·) | θ(·) = 0) = P(cB1(F (·)) + cB2(F (·)) ≤ 0(·) | θ(·) = 0)
= 0
by (21), where B2(F (·)) is the sampling distribution of X(·) given θ(·) = 0(·), and in the
posterior θ(·) ∼ B1(F (·)) +X(·). Consequently,
P(θ(·) ≤ 0(·) | X(·) ∈ S) P(X(·) ∈ S) ≤ 0. (22)
Specifically, let S be the complement of the test’s rejection region:
S = {x(·) : P(θ(·) ≤ 0(·) | X(·) = x(·)) > α}.
If P(X(·) ∈ S) > 0, then the left-hand side of (22) is the product of two strictly positive
terms (assuming α > 0), which is strictly positive. This contradicts (22) since the right-hand
side is zero. Consequently, P(X(·) ∈ S) = 0 and thus P(X(·) 6∈ S) = 1, i.e., the rejection
probability is one. (This does not mean S is empty, just that it is a zero-probability set.)
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Proof of Corollary 4. With θ(·) = 0(·), by Proposition 3, the probability of rejecting
SD1 is 100%; that is, the posterior probability of SD1 is below α with probability one (with
respect to the distribution of X(·)). Since the posterior probabilities of SD1 and non-SD1
sum to one, this implies the posterior probability of non-SD1 is above 1 − α (and thus the
test does not reject) with probability one.
B Example: bivariate normal sign equality test
Here, we provide additional mathematical and simulation details for one of the examples
mentioned in Section 3.1. Consider a bivariate normal model where the null hypothesis is
that the two parameters have the same sign (letting zero count either way), H0 : θ1θ2 ≥ 0.
Specifically,
X = (X1, X2)
′ ∼ N(µ,Σ), µ ≡ (θ1, θ2)′, Σ ≡
(
1 ρ
ρ 1
)
. (23)
By symmetry, the test’s size is the supremum of the test’s rejection probability over θ2 ∈
(−∞, 0] with θ1 = 0. The parameter values leading to the biggest rejection probability
depend on ρ; e.g., when ρ = 1, the supremum comes from θ2 → −∞, whereas when ρ = −1,
it comes at θ2 = 0.
To compute the Bayesian test, the posterior probability of H0 given any (X1, X2) must
be computed. Let the joint, conditional, and marginal PDFs of the N(0,Σ) distribution be
N(0,Σ) : f(t1, t2) ≡ det(2πΣ)−1/2 exp
{
−(t1, t2)Σ
−1(t1, t2)
′
2
}
=
1
2π
√
1− ρ2 exp
{
−t
2
1 + t
2
2 − 2ρt1t2
2(1− ρ2)
}
,
N(ρt2, 1− ρ2) : f(t1 | t2) ≡ 1√
2π(1− ρ2) exp{−(t1 − ρt2)
2/(2− 2ρ2)},
N(0, 1) : f(t2) ≡ 1√
2π
exp{−t22/2} = φ(t2),
(24)
where φ(·) is the standard normal PDF. Given (24),
∫ −X1
−∞
f(t1 | t2) dt1 = Φ
(
−X1 − ρt2√
1− ρ2
)
, (25)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal CDF. Using the prior expressions and the symmetry
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f(t1, t2) = f(−t1,−t2) = f(t2, t1),
P(H0 | X1, X2) =
∫ −X2
−∞
∫ −X1
−∞
f(t1, t2) dt1 dt2 +
∫ ∞
−X2
∫ ∞
−X1
f(t1, t2) dt1 dt2
=
∫ −X2
−∞
∫ −X1
−∞
f(t1 | t2)f(t2) dt1 dt2 +
∫ ∞
−X2
∫ ∞
−X1
f(t1 | t2)f(t2) dt1 dt2
=
∫ −X2
−∞
Φ
(
−X1 − ρt2√
1− ρ2
)
φ(t2) dt2 +
∫ ∞
−X2
[
1− Φ
(
−X1 − ρt2√
1− ρ2
)]
φ(t2) dt2.
Unfortunately, there is no closed-form expression for this P(H0 | X1, X2). However, it is
easily simulated. The function Φ(·) is available in any modern statistical software (e.g., R).
After drawing many Zj
iid∼ N(0, 1) for j = 1, . . . , J , letting Wj ≡ Φ((−X1 − ρZ)/
√
1− ρ2)
if Z < −X2 and Wj ≡ 1 − Φ((−X1 − ρZ)/
√
1− ρ2) if Z ≥ −X2, then P(H0 | X1, X2) ≈
J−1
∑J
j=1Wj, with the approximation error going to zero as J →∞.
Table 4: Bayesian test type I error rates, H0 : θ1θ2 ≥ 0, θ1 = 0, α = 0.1, 10,000 replications.
ρ
θ2 −1 −0.99 −0.9 −0.5 0 0.5 1
0.00 1.000 0.966 0.264 0.058 0.011 0.000 0.000
−0.25 1.000 0.717 0.253 0.059 0.011 0.000 0.000
−0.50 0.253 0.305 0.221 0.062 0.014 0.001 0.000
−4.00 0.100 0.102 0.102 0.101 0.099 0.094 0.093
−10.00 0.100 0.102 0.102 0.101 0.100 0.100 0.100
Max 1.000 0.966 0.264 0.101 0.100 0.100 0.100
Table 4 shows type I error rates of the Bayesian test of H0 : θ1θ2 ≥ 0 for different ρ and
different θ2, with θ1 = 0. When ρ = −1, it reduces to a one-dimensional setting with a
finite, convex Θ0, as in Theorem 1(iii); size equals one, well above α. When ρ = 1, it is
also essentially one-dimensional, but with non-convex Θ0, as in Theorem 1(iv); the type I
error rate is (near) zero at many points on the boundary of Θ0, but size equals α. When
ρ ∈ (−1, 1), we are also in the setting of Theorem 1(iv); size is strictly above α when ρ is
close to −1, but decreases to α somewhere between ρ = −0.9 and ρ = −0.5.
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C Derivation of translog constraints
The Hessian is a nonlinear function of the translog parameters, and it depends on (y,w).
Letting12
rk ≡ ∂ ln(C)
∂ ln(wk)
= ayk ln(y) + bk +
3∑
j=1
bjk ln(wj), (26)
a general element of H is
Hmk =
∂2C
∂wm∂wk
=
∂
∂wm
∂C
∂wk
=
∂
∂wm
(rkC/wk) =
∂rk
∂wm
(C/wk) +
∂C
∂wm
(rk/wk) +
∂w−1k
∂wm
(rkC)
= (bmk/wm)(C/wk) + rm(C/wm)(rk/wk)− 1{k = m}w−2k (rkC)
= C
bmk + rmrk − 1{k = m}rk
wmwk
.
Since each element is proportional to C > 0, the value of C does not affect whether or not
H is NSD: H is NSD iff H/C is NSD. This may be helpful if the translog parameters are
estimated from cost share equations and C is not directly observed.
The local NSD condition in (11) corresponds to a set of parameter values much smaller
than a half-space. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for NSD is that all the principal
minors of order p = 1 are non-positive, i.e., that H11 ≤ 0, H22 ≤ 0, and H33 ≤ 0. In
terms of the parameters, using (26), H11 ≤ 0 iff b11 + r21 − r1 ≤ 0, i.e., b11 ≤ r1(1 − r1).
With (y,w) = (1, 1, 1, 1), rk = bk, so H11 ≤ 0 iff b11 ≤ b1(1− b1). After imposing symmetry
(bmk = bkm) and homogeneity of degree one in input prices (bm1+bm2+bm3 = 0, m = 1, 2, 3),
all bmk can be written in terms of b11, b12, and b22: b21 = b12, b13 = −b11 − b12, etc. Also
from homogeneity, b1 + b2 + b3 = 1, and from monotonicity, bk = rk ≥ 0, so 0 ≤ b1 ≤ 1.
Thus, b1(1− b1) ∈ [0, 0.25], so b11 ≤ b1(1− b1) is larger than the half-space defined by b11 ≤ 0
but smaller than the half-space defined by b11 ≤ 0.25. A similar argument for H22 ≤ 0 at
(1, 1, 1, 1) yields b22 ≤ b2(1 − b2) ≤ 0.25. From the constraints on H11 and H22 alone, Θ0
is a subset of the “quarter-space” defined by b11 ≤ 0.25 and b22 ≤ 0.25. In the notation of
Theorem 1, we could use φ(θ) = b11 (or b22) and c0 = 0.25. Adding the constraints for the
other principal minors of H makes Θ0 even smaller.
Since the local concavity H0 in (11) corresponds to a subset of a quarter -space in the
parameter space, Theorem 1(iii) suggests that we expect the Bayesian test’s size to exceed
α. The results in Table 3 show this to be the case here.
12Some notation is from O’Donnell and Coelli (2005).
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D Infinite-dimensional Bernstein–von Mises theorems
As noted, an infinite-dimensional Bernstein–von Mises theorem is not needed to satisfy
Assumption A1, which only concerns the distribution of a finite-dimensional functional.
However, the results and references below may be helpful or insightful in some cases.
For estimators of functions, it is common to have a (frequentist) Gaussian process
limit with sample paths continuous with respect to the covariance semimetric; e.g., see
van der Vaart and Wellner (1996). A natural question is whether the (asymptotic, limit
experiment) sampling and posterior distributions are ever equivalent in the sense of
X(·)− θ(·) | θ(·) ∼ G, θ(·)−X(·) | X(·) ∼ G,
where G is a mean-zero Gaussian process with known covariance function.
Unfortunately, as discussed by Freedman (1999) and others, such a Bernstein–von Mises
result does not hold in great generality with infinite-dimensional spaces. As explained by
Hirano and Porter (2009, p. 1696), in finite dimensions the prior often behaves locally like
Lebesgue measure (if its PDF is continuous and positive at the true parameter value), but
in infinite-dimensional Banach spaces there is no analog of Lebesgue measure, let alone one
that most priors would satisfy.
Fortunately, some nonparametric Bernstein–von Mises theorems do exist. As in the
(semi)parametric case, there are different ways to define “asymptotically equivalent distri-
butions”; see Definition 2 in Castillo and Nickl (2014, p. 1950) for an example. The most
general results to date seem to be provided by Castillo and Nickl (2013, 2014); see also
Sections 12.4.1 and 12.2 of Ghosal and van der Vaart (2017).
One important special case where a Bernstein–von Mises theorem holds is for inference
on a CDF. On the frequentist side, assuming iid sampling,
√
n
(
Fˆ (·)− F (·)) B(F (·)), (27)
where B(·) is a standard Brownian bridge and denotes weak convergence in ℓ∞(R¯); e.g., see
van der Vaart and Wellner (1996, Ex. 2.1.3). For weak convergence under sequences Fn(·)→
F (·), see Sections 2.8.3 and 3.11 and especially Theorem 3.10.12 in van der Vaart and Wellner
(1996). For a nonparametric Bayesian method using the Dirichlet process prior of Ferguson
(1973), Lo (1983, Thm. 2.1) shows that a centered (at Fˆ (·)) and √n-scaled version of the
posterior converges to the same limit as in (27) if the prior dominates F (·). Even with an
improper prior, i.e., using the Bayesian bootstrap of Rubin (1981), Lo (1987, Thm. 2.1) estab-
lishes the same result. A closely related result is Theorem 12.2 of Ghosal and van der Vaart
(2017). An analogous conclusion is found in Theorem 4 of Castillo and Nickl (2014), but as
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a special case of their more general results. They can provide Bernstein–von Mises theorems
for (certain) collections of integral functionals of the PDF,
∫ 1
0
gt(x)f(x) dx, where f(·) is the
PDF with support [0, 1] and t indexes the collection; for the CDF, gt(x) = 1{x ≤ t} for
t ∈ [0, 1].
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